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Abstract 
Two studies examine the hypothesis that older adults experience a decrement in interoceptive 
information when representing emotion concepts. To test this hypothesis, adults aged 18-75 
completed property verification tasks in an online study to validate emotion property words as 
describing one of three conceptual modalities (interoceptive, behavioral, or situational). 
Participants then rated property words across all three modalities as representing discrete 
emotion categories such as fear, anger, sadness, disgust, and boredom. As predicted, older adults 
were less likely to rate interoceptive properties as representing discrete emotion categories, while 
differences in ratings for situational and behavioral properties do not differ. The implications of 
these findings for the embodiment of emotion and “maturational dualism” are discussed. 
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The body is a fundamental element of emotion. Philosophers have long known this 
intuitively—the etymology of the word “emotion” is “to stir up; to move around”. However, 
contemporary research demonstrates that physiological states and the experience of emotion are 
in fact linked. For example, individuals who are better at detecting their own heartbeats are also 
more likely to experience emotions as highly arousing states (e.g., more likely to report 
experiencing “anger,” “disgust,” “fear,” and “excitement” than “sadness,” “depression,” and 
“contentment”; Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 2004; Dunn et al., 2010). 
Individuals with greater chronic coherence in the brain network that represents bodily changes 
(including the ventral anterior insula, ventral anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, and 
orbitofrontal cortex) also experience emotions as more arousing (Touroutoglou, Hollenbeck, 
Dickerson, & Barrett, 2012).  
These findings, which suggest that changes in internal bodily feedback lead to changes in 
emotion experience (for review, see Critchley, 2009), are consistent with a psychological 
constructionist theory of emotion (and more specifically with the Conceptual Act Theory; CAT), 
which states that emotions emerge when sensory feedback from internal bodily changes and 
from the external environment are made meaningful in light of the current situation (Barrett, 
2014; Lindquist, 2013). A major advantage of the CAT is that it conceives of emotions as 
consisting of more basic psychological components. Alterations to any one of those components 
(either via experimental manipulation, pathology, or normative developmental changes) should 
alter the resulting emotional experience. Following the predictions of the CAT, I hypothesize 
that declines in physiological sensitivity due to aging cause older adults to draw less on internal 
bodily feedback when conceptualizing their emotions.  
Psychological Constructionism and the Conceptual Act Theory  
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Psychological constructionism posits that emotions emerge as a result of more basic 
psychological processes (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, 2013). This viewpoint runs counter to the 
basic theory of emotion, which states that each discrete emotion category such as “fear” or 
“sadness” has its own distinctive and universal neural, physiological, and behavioral properties 
rooted in causal neural and psychological mechanisms across persons (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; 
Panksepp, 1998; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996; for discussion, see Barrett, 2006). In other words, 
this commonsense view of emotion assumes that the characteristics of English emotion 
categories such as “fear,” “anger,” “disgust,” and “happiness” are generated and experienced the 
same way across all people.  
By contrast, growing evidence suggests that emotions are not biologically basic 
categories. For instance, evidence suggests that emotions are not triggered from specific neural 
structures that produce consistent physiological and behavioral outcomes (Kober et al. 2008; 
Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012; Touroutoglou, Lindquist, Dickerson, 
Barrett, 2015). Rather, many neural and psychological processes are involved in emotion 
construction (e.g., language, internal bodily feedback, external sensory feedback, and executive 
functioning) (Lindquist et al. 2012). These psychological processes are supported by multiple 
distributed networks in the brain, which interact together to produce the experience of emotion 
(e.g., Oosterwijk et al. 2012; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, Barsalou, 2011; for a 
review see Lindquist & Barrett, 2012).  
The CAT, one psychological constructionist approach, states that we experience an 
instance of emotion when internal bodily feedback (core affect) and exteroceptive feedback from 
outside the body are made meaningful in a given situation using one’s conceptual knowledge of 
emotion (Barrett, 2014; Lindquist, 2013). This process of conceptualizing our sensory feedback 
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in the context of the current situation is called “situated conceptualization” (cf., Wilson-
Mendenhall et al. 2011). Emotions emerge when a priori conceptual knowledge acquired from 
prior experiences is used to integrate and make sense of bodily and situational information 
(Barrett, 2014; Barrett, & Lindquist, 2008; Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011). For instance, prior 
evidence has shown that individuals experience the emotion fear when they make meaning of 
unpleasant feelings using knowledge about the concept “fear” (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008).  
The CAT thus captures the ideographic and situated variations underlying emotion 
experience between-persons and between-situations: a difference in core affect, conceptual 
knowledge, or the current situation shifts the resultant emotion experience. Aging serves as an 
avenue to examine how natural shifts in one ingredient of emotion—core affect—have 
downstream consequences for emotion and provides a means of testing the conceptual act theory.  
Emotion & Aging 
In the psychological literature, it is well known that aging is associated with changes in 
cognition (e.g., slower cognitive processing; Salthouse, 1994), sensory processing (e.g., 
increased neurological signal latency; Truett, Hume, Wood, & Goff, 1984), and proprioceptive 
abilities (e.g., declines in muscle mass and quality, Goodpaster et al., 2006). However, growing 
evidence suggests that older adults also experience changes in the ability to sense changes in 
one’s own body—also known as interoception—over time. For instance, Khalsa, Rudrauf, & 
Tranel (2009) have shown in a cross-sectional study that older adults are less able to accurately 
detect their heartbeats than younger adults (a common index of interoceptive sensitivity). Aging 
is also associated with the attenuation of peripheral physiological responses, such that older 
adults have a smaller magnitude of physiological responses during emotions than do younger 
adults (Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 1991). Levenson et al. (1991) found that older 
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adults experience less heart rate and finger temperature detection than younger when they are 
induced to experience anger, fear, sadness, happiness, disgust, and surprise.  
Mendes (2010) recently reviewed these age-related changes in interoception and 
peripheral physiology and proposed that, due to declines in interoception and physiological 
sensitivity, older adults may be likely to experience maturational dualism, that is—changes in 
emotional experience due to the weakening of the mind-body connection. In this view, older 
adults receive less input from the body during emotion and become less aware of that input 
compared to younger adults; as a result, older adults may even become “less emotional.”  
However, despite these domain-specific declines, older adults tend to adapt to age-related 
changes and are able to compensate for the loss of one function by recruiting from other 
domains. For instance, older adults recruit more cortical regions across both sides of the brain 
during high level memory tasks, which in turn may help older adults compensate for domain-
specific declines (Cabeza, Anderson, Locantore, & McIntosh, 2002; Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 
2008). In the same vein, if older adults are not drawing as much on interoceptive feedback to 
inform their situated conceptualizations of emotion (in line with maturational dualism), then 
older adults may continue to rely on situational and behavioral cues to make sense of their 
feelings, rather than interoceptive cues. Our hypothesis, if supported, could help reveal why 
older adults report experiencing fewer negative emotions (Carstensen, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 
2000), have a harder time recognizing emotions displayed in the faces of others (Somerville, 
Fani, & MaClure-Tone, 2011), are more likely to co-endorse experiences of pleasant and 
unpleasant emotional experiences (Labouvie-Vief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1989; Ready, Carvalho, & 
Weinberger, 2008), and have greater skill at emotion regulation (see Ong & Bergeman, 2004). If 
older adults rely less on interoceptive cues but rely the same or more on situational and 
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behavioral cues (when compared with younger adults), then this would be an important step 
towards addressing how older adults’ ways of conceptualizing their emotions may change in 
response to, and even to compensate for, physiological declines relevant to emotion experience. 
These differences in emotion experience and regulation could be a result of decreased peripheral 
physiological activity (or a less accurate interoceptive representation of physiology).  
However, none of these studies address how emotion conceptualization may differ with 
age. Thus, the present studies are a first step towards understanding the nature of older adults’ 
emotion conceptualization. To do so we compare older and younger adults’ interoceptive, 
behavioral, and situational conceptualizations of discrete emotion to determine if older adults do 
indeed rely less on interoceptive emotion properties than younger adults do, and if older adults 
rely more or similarly on behavioral and situational emotion properties compared with younger 
adults.  
Measuring Emotion Conceptualization 
Growing evidence suggests that conceptual knowledge is embodied, or represented by the 
sensorimotor modalities responsible for creating experiences in the first place (Glenberg & 
Gallese, 2012; for review, see Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013). For example, when people think about 
their favorite candy they actively represent what that candy tastes and looks like in the gustatory 
and visual systems of the brain (Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013). This model of cognition proposes that 
concepts are “grounded” in modality-specific systems such as interoceptive bodily 
representations, modal-specific exteroceptive representations such as vision or audition, as well 
as situated actions (Barsalou, 2009). Embodied cognition suggests all concepts have properties 
rooted in some combination of interoceptive bodily feedback, proprioceptive feedback from the 
body’s situated actions and behaviors (such as muscle tension and movement), and exteroceptive 
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feedback from the situation (e.g., visual stimuli, auditory stimuli, tactile stimuli, etc.; for 
discussions, see Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou, 2012; Berlucchi & Aglioti, 2010; Stapleton, 2013). 
Likewise, the CAT extends the predictions of embodied cognition to suggest that emotion 
concepts—what someone knows about different emotion categories such as anger, disgust, fear, 
etc.—are grounded in different modalities of experience (for empirical evidence and a full 
discussion of emotion-relevant modalities, see Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Wilson-Mendenhall et 
al., 2011). For example, conceptual knowledge about “anger” is acquired through both direct 
experience (e.g., your own experiences of anger or observing someone else being angry) and 
transmission (e.g., what others tell you about the nature of anger, what metaphors your language 
has for anger, etc.) but this acquisition of the category “anger” is also rooted in multiple 
modalities of experience (see Lindquist, MacCormack, & Shablack, 2015 for discussion). The 
English category “anger” may include what situations precede anger, co-occur with anger, or 
happen after anger, and also what interoceptive bodily sensations as well as nonverbal behaviors 
and actions are associated with anger in these different situations. All of these dimensions of 
“what it means to be angry” are rooted in the modalities of experience. Even transmitted 
knowledge about anger like a language’s metaphors for anger are primarily rooted in concrete, 
embodied ways (e.g., “he boiled with anger”, “she was seething”, “she’s hot-headed”, or “he 
went purple with rage”; see Kovecses, 2003 for a comprehensive review of emotion metaphors). 
Thus, the outcome of situated conceptualization will differ depending on variation in the current 
content of the interoceptive, behavioral, and situational modalities.  
The Present Studies 
In the present studies, I draw on methods from the embodiment literature to assess 
potential differences between the interoceptive nature of older and younger adults’ embodied 
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conceptual knowledge of emotion. As the CAT suggests that emotions are the emergent product 
of core affective changes, exteroceptive feedback, and conceptual knowledge, we proposed that 
emotion concept knowledge may included three primary modalities: (1) the interoceptive 
component of emotion experience (e.g., feeling “butterflies” in the stomach; racing heart), (2) the 
behavioral component, related to our own and others’ behaviors (e.g., clenched fists; frowning; 
running away), and finally (3) the situational component, rooted in inferences about what the 
situation means (e.g., loss, injustice, immorality). Specifically, we hypothesize that older adults 
will, due to maturational dualism, rely less on the interoceptive modality when conceptualizing 
emotions and focus more on the behavioral aspects of emotion (e.g., emotion-relevant behaviors 
like smiling or frowning) and situational aspects of emotions (e.g., appraisals that a situation is 
unjust, or that harm is being done) when conceptualizing emotions. Drawing on cognitive 
paradigms from the embodied concept knowledge literature (e.g., Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, 
Minor, & Thompson-Schill, 2003), we tested this hypothesis in two studies.  
In Study 1, participants rated 180 emotion properties as interoceptive, behavioral, or 
situational and also rated how much they associated each property with five different negative 
emotion categories (anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and boredom). We then selected 100 of the 
highest rated properties that clearly fell into one of the three modalities to standardize properties 
for the next study. In Study 2, we used a property verification task similar to one used by Kan et 
al. 2003 in which they found that semantic knowledge is grounded in the visual association 
cortex of the brain. In our property verification task, participants rated how much each emotion 
property came to mind when thinking about a specific emotion concept (e.g., how much does 
HOT come to mind when thinking about ANGER?); here, we measured both explicit responses 
(using a likert scale) and implicit responses (using reaction time measurement) to effectively 
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measure the availability of interoceptive vs. behavioral vs. situational information in older vs. 
younger adults’ emotion concepts.  
Study 1 
The goal of Study 1 was twofold. First, we assessed the hypothesis that older adults 
would be less likely to associate emotion property words (e.g., “hot”) with the interoceptive 
modality and with discrete emotion concepts (anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and boredom) as 
compared to younger adults. Second, we used ratings from Study 1 to validate the suitability of 
interoceptive, behavioral, and situational properties for use in subsequent studies.  
Methods 
Participants 
169 participants (61.2% female) were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Forty-three out of the full sample of 169 participants did not wish to disclose their age, 
however their data was not excluded because the main focus of this study was to evaluate the 
properties of words. Age calculations with the remaining 126 participants revealed a range of 18-
72 with 74% of participants falling between the ages of 18-40, 9% between 41-50, and 17% 
between 51-72. Ethnicity and race were representative of typical American-wide demographics 
(66.4% European American, 11.2% African American, 3.0% Asian American, 1.4% Native 
American, and 6.0m% Latin American. Total annual income ranged from $0 to $400,000 per 
year (Mincome = $60,158.76, SD= $50,281.34).  
Measures 
Stimulus development. In pilot testing, we developed 180 emotion property words based 
on each of the three modalities of emotion experience. For example, interoceptive properties 
included: “blood pumping,” “drowsy,” and “nauseous”; behavioral properties included: 
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“frowning,” “moaning,” and “looking away”; situational properties included “cheated,” 
“uncertainty,” and “abandoned”.  
Procedures 
 Participants first read about the study on Mechanical Turk. They were told that this was 
an “emotion knowledge survey” and then were asked to participate for $0.60 monetary 
compensation. Participants were directed to Qualtrics via Mechanical Turk and gave their 
consent to participate.  
Emotion modality ratings. Next, participants read the following instructions: “For this 
first task, you will rate 60 words based on their emotional properties. All words are related to 
experiences you might have when feeling an emotion. When reading a word, try to imagine 
yourself in relation to that word. How does it feel in your body? What actions or behaviors might 
you take as a result? What situation would you be in to experience that word? These three 
questions will help guide you in rating how much the 60 words fit into bodily, behavioral, or 
situational categories. Remember: please answer these questions using your knowledge of your 
own and other people's emotions.”   
Participants then rated 60 emotion properties randomly selected from the 180 total 
properties. To reduce participant burden, participants did not rate all 180 properties, but we 
ensured that all properties were evenly presented across participants (so that all 180 items were 
represented).  These 60 emotion properties were broken into 6 blocks of 10 words each with an 
attention check at the end of each block. The order of properties was also randomized across all 
participants to avoid order effects. Participants reported on the following, using a Likert scale (1 
= not at all to 5 = completely): (1) “How much does this describe bodily feelings you could have 
when feeling emotional?” (2) “How much does this describe actions you might take when feeling 
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emotional?” and (3) “How much does this describe a situation in which you’d feel emotional?” 
Given our sample size (N=131), the range of people that rated each emotion property by 
modality was 39-48.  
Discrete emotion ratings. After rating the extent to which each of the 60 properties were 
deemed to be interoceptive, behavioral, or situational, participants then read instructions for the 
second task. The instructions were as follows: “Next, we will ask you about how much you 
associate 30 words randomly selected from the previous task with 5 different emotion categories 
(anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and boredom). You may see new words that are different from the 
words you saw on the previous task.” To control for the impact of valence dimensions on 
emotion judgments, we confined our emotion categories to the negative portion of affective 
space. Based on normative ratings (Russell, 1980), anger, fear, and disgust are rated to be high 
arousal emotions whereas sadness and boredom are deemed to be low arousal emotions.  
In the second task, participants rated on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = Not at all to 5 = 
Completely) how strongly they associated 30 emotion properties with each of the five discrete 
emotion categories (anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and boredom).  Because participants were 
rating each property five times (once for each emotion), we only presented 30 emotion properties 
to reduce participant burden. However, these 30 emotion properties were randomly selected from 
the previous task and evenly presented (so that all 180 items were represented). These questions 
were split in two blocks of 15 questions. The order of these questions was randomized across 
participants to avoid order effects. Given our sample size (N=131), the range of people that rated 
each emotion property for discrete emotion associations was 39-48.  
Demographics. Following the second task, participants reported their age, gender, 
ethnicity, level of education, and total annual income.  
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Results 
 To assess differences in emotion modality associations, we calculated a mean score for 
all three modalities (an interoceptive mean, behavioral mean, and situational mean) based on 
participants’ likert scale ratings (i.e., “How much does this describe a bodily feeling you would 
have when experiencing an emotion?”). To assess differences in emotion concept associations, 
we calculated a mean score for each discrete emotion concept, resulting in five discrete emotion 
means (anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and boredom). All variables demonstrated univariate and 
multivariate normality (see Table 1 for means, standard deviations, and ranges for the modality 
and emotion concept means). Bivariate correlations between all modality and emotion means, 
age, and gender are presented in Table 2.  
Validating Suitability. Based on the modality and discrete emotion category ratings for 
all 180 properties, we selected 100 properties that were most clearly rated as interoceptive only, 
behavioral only, or situational only, and also those that were most clearly associated with only 
one discrete emotion. To clarify which emotion modality participants had most strongly 
associated with each emotion property, we calculated a total across-modality mean rating for 
each property word by averaging the three modality means. We then calculated a difference 
score for each property’s individual modalities (e.g., interoceptive) by subtracting the other two 
modalities from the total across-modality mean. This allowed us to determine how uniquely 
“interoceptive” each emotion property was based on participants’ ratings, vs. how uniquely 
behavioral or situational. If one of the modality means of a property word was >.1 than the total 
mean score of that property word, and the other two modality means were <0.0 than the total 
mean score, we assigned that property word to the corresponding modality (e.g., “hot” modality 
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total mean score = 2.82, interoceptive mean score = 3.41, behavioral mean score = 2.32, and 
situational mean score = 2.73).   
To clarify which discrete emotion concept participants had most strongly associated with 
each emotion property, we calculated mean scores for each property word according to the five 
emotion concepts (anger mean, sadness mean, disgust mean, fear mean, boredom mean) based 
on how participants responded to the concept specific questions (i.e., “How much does this 
describe anger/sadness/disgust/fear/boredom?”).We then calculated a total across-emotions mean 
score for each property word by averaging across the five emotion concepts for that particular 
emotion property ([anger mean + sadness mean + disgust mean + fear mean + boredom mean] ÷ 
5) Each property’s concept mean score was then compared to its total across-emotions mean 
score to determine if participants were more likely to report it as being an attribute of one 
concept more so than the others. If one of the concept means of a property word was >.1 than the 
total concept mean score of that property word, and the other two modality means were <0.0 than 
the total mean score, I assigned that property word to the corresponding concept (e.g., “hot” 
concept total mean score = 1.99, for anger mean score = 3.11, sadness mean score = 1.53, disgust 
mean score = 1.95, fear mean score= 1.84, and boredom mean score = 1.53). The final list of 100 
emotion properties included 40 interoceptive properties, 29 behavioral properties, and 31 
situational properties. Each property was linked to its most strongly associated discrete emotion 
to then formed a concept-property item (for example, “ANGER-hot” where “anger” is the 
emotion concept and “hot” is the interoceptive property; see Appendix for a full list of the final 
100 concept-property items). 
Determining Age Differences. To test our prediction that older adults would be 
significantly less likely to rate emotion properties as interoceptive, we ran linear regressions with 
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age (i.e., years old) as a continuous predictor.  Age was a significant predictor of interoceptive 
ratings (β = -.01, p = .009), suggesting that older adults are less likely to rate emotion properties 
in general as interoceptive compared to younger adults. Age only marginally predicted 
behavioral ratings (β = -.01, p = .077), suggesting that older adults may be less likely to rate 
emotion properties as behavioral compared to younger adults. However, age was not a 
significant predictor of situational ratings (β = -.003, p = .572), suggesting that older and younger 
adults are equally likely to rate properties of emotions as situational. See Figures 1, 2, and 3 for 
scatterplots of each regression. 
We also tested whether age predicted any significant modality differences across all 
discrete emotion categories. After computing a mean score for all Interoceptive properties across 
all discrete emotion ratings, a mean score for all behavioral properties across all discrete emotion 
ratings, and a mean score for all situational properties across all discrete emotion ratings, we 
used multiple linear regressions with age as the predictor. We found that age was a significant 
predictor of interoceptive ratings across all emotion categories ((β = -.011, p = .011), such that 
older adults were less likely to indicate that interoceptive phenomena (e.g., “hot”) were a 
property of specific discrete emotion categories. Age was also a marginally significant predictor 
for behavioral ratings across all emotion categories (β = -.007, p = .084), but was not a 
significant predictor for situational ratings across all emotion categories (β = -.003, p = .573), 
See Figures 1, 2, and 3 for scatterplots of each regression.  
 
Study 2 
The goal of Study 2 was to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1 in a new sample 
with a new method. Based on our findings from Study 1, we used the properties that participants 
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deemed to be the best examples of interoceptive, behavioral and situational properties, as well as 
the properties that were most indicative of each of the five emotion categories. To assess whether 
age changes older adults’ embodied representations of emotion categories, we used a property 
verification task (Kan et al. 2003) in which participants rated how much each property came to 
mind when thinking about a specific emotion concept (e.g., how much does ABANDONED 
come to mind when thinking about SAD?). We predicted that older adults would be less likely to 
describe interoceptive properties as representing discrete emotions.  
Participants 
151 (57.3% female) participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). Age calculations reveal a range of 18-75 with 56.6% falling between 18-40, 17.2% 
between 41-49, and 26.2% between 50-75. Ethnicity and race were representative of typical 
American-wide demographics (78.7% European American, 5.3% African American, 6.0% Asian 
American, and 6.0% Latin American). Total annual income ranged from $0.00 to $167000.00per 
year (Mincome = $48292.25, SD= 35384.98).  
Measures  
In Study 1, we developed 100 emotion property words based on each of the three 
modalities of emotion experience that were validated in Study 1 (see appendix). 
Procedures 
Participants first read about the study on Mechanical Turk. They were informed that this 
was an “emotion knowledge survey” and self-selected to participate for a $0.60. Participants 
were directed to Qualtrics via Mechanical Turk and gave their consent to participate once they 
arrived at Qualtrics.  
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Association ratings and reaction times. Next, participants read the following 
instructions: “In this task, you will rate how much a word comes to mind when thinking about a 
specific emotion. This task is timed, so please work as quickly and accurately as you can.”  
Participants then rated how much they thought an emotion property word comes to mind when 
thinking about a discrete emotion concept. Participants were shown an emotion concept (e.g., 
ANGER) and asked a question about a corresponding emotion property that was either 
interoceptive, behavioral, or situational in nature (e.g., “How much does HOT come to mind 
when you think about anger?”). Participants answered using a 9-point Likert scale (0 = Did not 
come to mind at all to 9 = Immediately came to mind).  Participants rated all 100 concept-
property pairs, which were randomized across participants. Additionally, we used Qualtrics’ 
built-in reaction time measure, which measures the time it takes for participants to click on their 
answer. These provided us with 100 reaction time measures, provided in seconds and 
milliseconds.  
Demographics. Following the association task, participants reported their age, gender, 
ethnicity, level of education, and total annual income.  
Data Preparation 
 This study’s intent was to determine whether the availability of interoceptive properties is 
impacted by age, whereas the availability of behavioral and situational properties should not be 
affected by age. Before addressing this hypothesis, we first cleaned the data by removing 
individuals who failed one or both of our two attention checks. Additionally, we excluded items 
where the reaction time was over one minute or under 200 milliseconds (ms). The choice to 
exclude items under 200 ms is rooted in common reaction time practice (Whelan, 2008), while 
my decision to exclude items over one minute was data-driven. Looking at the distribution of all 
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participants’ reaction times across all items, it was clear that most participants responded within 
the first 30 seconds, and that outliers emerged after one minute.  
Results 
To test our prediction that older adults would be significantly less likely to rate 
interoceptive emotion properties as coming to mind when thinking about discrete emotion 
concepts, we ran a multilevel linear model. The outcome of interest was participants’ likert 
ratings for each individual concept property item. As participants rated multiple items in the 
study, this leads to a multi-level design, with item nested within person. Adding in random 
effects to the model also allowed every individual to have their own unique mean tendency for 
interoceptive, behavioral, and situational ratings.  
To ensure that the effects were interpretable, age was centered at the lowest age in the 
sample, 18 years old—so that all positive values would indicate an increase in ratings compared 
to ratings at age 18 (the intercept) and all negative values would indicate a decrease in ratings 
compared to ratings at age 18. Age was a continuous variable. Additionally, an age2 term was 
calculated to address potential curvilinear effects of age.  
 Level 1 and Level 2 equations are presented below: 
Level 1:  𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑘 =  𝜋0 + 𝜋1 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝜋2 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐵𝑒ℎ + 𝜋3 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 +
 𝜖𝑖𝑘 
Level 2: 𝜋0 =  𝛽00 +  𝛽01 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽02 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛
2 + 𝛾00𝑘 
𝜋1 =  𝛽10 +  𝛽11 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛 +  𝛽12 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛
2 + 𝛾10𝑘 
𝜋2 =  𝛽20 +  𝛽21 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛 +  𝛽22 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛
2 +  𝛾20𝑘 
𝜋3 =  𝛽30 
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And the reduced form equation was: 
 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑘 =  𝛽00 +  𝛽01 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛 +  𝛽02 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛
2 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽11 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛 ∗
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽12 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛
2 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽20 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏𝑒ℎ +  𝛽21 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛 ∗
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏𝑒ℎ +  𝛽22 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛
2 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏𝑒ℎ +  𝛽30 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛾00𝑘 +  𝛾10𝑘 +
 𝛾20𝑘  + 𝜖𝑖𝑘 
Or more simply, the condensed statistical model was:  
Likert Ratings = Intercept + Age(cen) + Age(cen)2 + Modality + (Age × Modality) + 
(Age2 × Modality) + RT + Random Effects + Error  
Here, the 𝛽s are the fixed effects for the main effect and interaction terms in the model, 
and the 𝛾s are the random intercepts for each individual on each of the modalities. Each modality 
was coded 0-1 and situational items served as the reference group so as to allow parsing apart 
how behavioral and interoceptive items might differ with age in comparison to situational items. 
Therefore the 𝛽0∗ coefficients represent the intercept and effects of age (at 18 years old) on the 
situational items, and the other effects represent the difference for interoceptive and behavioral 
items in the intercept and effects of ages from the effects of the situational items. Reaction time 
for each item was included in the model to control for potential age effects on reaction time (in 
case older adults might be slower than younger adults). Additionally, the random intercepts 
allow each individual to have their own unique mean score on interoceptive, behavioral and 
situational items. All random intercepts were allowed to correlate freely with one another (thus 
having an unstructured covariance matrix).  
There were several significant fixed effects. The intercepts for behavioral and 
interoceptive items were both significantly lower than that of situational items (B= -.48, p= .028; 
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B= -.53, p= .033), suggesting that on average, participants aged 18 tended to endorse behavioral 
and interoceptive items less than situational items. There were no main effects of age nor age 
squared (B= -.05, p= .184; B= .01, p= .483), meaning that age did not significantly predict 
individual’s responses for situational modalities. Nor were there age x modality or age-squared x 
modality interactions for behavioral items (B= .01, p= .505; B= -.01, p= .741), suggesting that 
age does not significantly predict individual’s responses for behavior modalities of emotion 
concepts. However, there were significant interactions between age x modality and age-squared 
x modality for interoceptive items (B= .06, p= .006; B= -.01, p=.016), suggesting a general trend 
of increasing responses for interoceptive items as age increases into late adulthood (the linear 
Age effect), and then a decreasing rate of responses on interoceptive items into old age (the Age-
squared curvilinear effect). These age effects for situational, behavioral, and interoceptive 
modalities are plotted in Figure 4. 
Discussion 
In two studies, I tested whether older adults conceptualize their emotions differently than 
younger adults. Across both studies, I found that older adults do indeed experience an 
interoceptive-general decrement in their representation of emotion concepts. For example, in 
Study 1, older adults are less likely to see an emotion property word (e.g., hot) as representing an 
internal feeling that you would have when experiencing an emotion. Furthermore, older adults 
are less likely to think of interoceptive property words as describing specific discrete emotions 
(e.g., hot describes anger). In Study 2, I again found that older adults are less likely to associate 
interoceptive property words with specific discrete emotions. Additionally, Study 2 suggests that 
the influence of interoceptive information in informing a person’s emotion concepts is 
curvilinear – that is, it increases until middle age and then decreases (see Figure 4).   
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With regards to non-interoceptive properties, I found in Study 1 that older adults are 
marginally less likely to see a behavioral emotion property word (e.g., clenched fists) as 
representing a behavior that is linked to emotional experience in general or specific discrete 
emotions in particular (e.g., that clenched fists describes anger). However, in Study 2, I found 
that older adults are not less likely to associate behavioral property words with the domain of 
emotion or particular discrete emotions than younger adults. In both Studies 1 and 2, age was not 
a significant predictor of participants’ situational ratings, suggesting that older adults do not 
conceptualize the situational nature of emotions differently from younger adults.  
These findings suggest that emotion concepts vary as a result of age. Overall, older adults 
are less likely to rate interoceptive emotion properties as describing an emotional experience, 
which may support the maturational dualism hypothesis.  Older adults are perhaps also less 
likely to associate behavioral properties with discrete emotions (see Table 2), but these findings 
were marginal in Study 1 and not present in Study 2, suggesting that the simulation of behavior 
properties in the brain may be weakened by aging because it involves an aspect of the body, 
however not to the same extent as interoception. Future studies should investigate the possible 
links between modalities, and especially the one between behavior and interoception. It is likely 
the case that, because all concepts are embodied (see Kiefer & Barsalou, 2013), behavioral and 
situational modalities are in some way embodied, but may draw less on embodied processes that 
are impacted with age (e.g., peripheral physiology, interoceptive abilities). 
Since embodied representations inform concept knowledge and vice-a-versa (see Barrett 
& Lindquist, 2008), the fact that older adults’ emotion concepts are less embodied may be a 
result of less intense embodied emotional experiences in daily life, due to the attenuation of the 
peripheral nervous system. It could also be the case that older adults’ concept knowledge is less 
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interoceptive merely due to generational effects in emotion concept knowledge. For instance, 
older adults, who developed their emotion knowledge during a different period of history than 
younger adults, might merely know and emphasize different aspects of emotions than younger 
adults. Regardless of the cause, the fact that older adults’ concepts are informed less by 
interoceptive information could create a difference in emotional experience if concepts are used 
to make meaning of one’s affective state in the moment. Psychological constructionism predicts 
that concept knowledge about emotion categories is used in the moment when individuals make 
meaning of their core affective states (e.g., Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). If older adults’ concepts 
involve less interoceptive information, then an older adult might be less likely to make meaning 
of a beating heart as an experience of fear than a younger adult.  
Basic information processing (e.g., reasoning, spatial orientation) declines with old age, 
while pragmatic abilities (e.g., verbal knowledge) do not show such declines (Baltes, Staudinger, 
& Lindenberger, 1999). This might also impact how emotions are constructed, and should be 
kept in mind by researchers attempting to explain the disparity between younger and older 
adults’ emotional experiences. In the current study, we attempted to account for the expected 
cognitive disparities that are seen in older as compared to younger adults by controlling for 
reaction times in Study 2 when computing each participant’s likert rating for each individual 
property item. Our results still show significant differences between interoceptive property 
associations as a function of age. However, in study 2 we found a curvilinear relationship 
between likert scores and age, suggesting that people do not reach their interoceptive awareness 
peak at age 18, but rather that they grow into interoceptive awareness by mid-30s and start to 
decline from that point on. It may be that individuals still develop embodied knowledge about 
emotion through early adulthood but that this information becomes less relevant as the peripheral 
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nervous system starts to change in middle age and beyond. Future research should address this 
question by assessing whether embodied concept knowledge tracks with individuals’ actual 
interoceptive abilities (e.g., in a heartbeat detection task).   
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are several limitations to the present studies. First, as mentioned previously, these 
studies did not measure actual experiences of emotion—they instead measured individuals’ 
emotion concepts. Emotion concepts are likely informed via experience (Lindquist et al. 2015), 
and might in turn shape experiences (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008; see Lindquist, Satpute, & 
Gendron, 2015 for a review), but are not the same as actual momentary experiences of emotion. 
To address this question, future studies should see if physiological responses to tasks that are 
meant to elicit an emotional response vary with age. A fear induction task may cause a quicker 
and more rapid heartbeat in younger adults, and it may take less stimulation for them to self-
report experiencing fear. Finding this “stimulation threshold” is another direction for future 
studies. Additionally, neuroimaging might provide insight into the biological differences that 
may be occurring when individuals experience an instance of fear.    
 Another limitation is that these studies were cross-sectional. It could be that older adults’ 
access to interoceptive language differs from younger adults. Older adults might use other words 
to describe their bodily states because of generational differences in language use or conceptual 
knowledge. Given that semantic knowledge is grounded in modality specific systems in the brain 
(Kiefer, & Barsalou, 2013), future researchers may consider using reaction time and property 
switching tasks to investigate whether or not simulation is occurring differently as a function of 
age (see Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003). Longitudinal study designs may look to 
compare daily emotion journals of younger adults as compared to older adults, or even track the 
26 
Embodied concepts and aging 
 
nature of a person’s emotion self-reports across several decades to see if the descriptions use less 
interoceptive words.  
Implications 
The aging process is characterized by change. Mental and physical capacities vary 
depending on age and lifestyle. Aging brings with it modality-specific declines—for example, 
decreased memory (Buckner, 2004), poorer executive function (Buckner, 2004), and less 
sensitive physiological feedback (Khalsa et al., 2009; Mendes, 2010). Because of the constructed 
nature of emotions, one should expect the emotional experience of older adults to also change. 
This study provides insight into what the change in older adults’ emotional experience might be 
– a decline in overall interoceptive accessibility. Future research on aging and emotion should be 
mindful of these discrepancies in interoceptive awareness that accompany aging.  
In order to maintain a high level of functioning, research suggests that aging individuals 
selectively optimize their lives, behaviors, and experiences in efforts to compensate for these 
modality-specific declines – as well as relying on overcompensation in brain (Baltes et al., 1999; 
Reuter-Lorenz, & Cappell, 2008). Future research should thus investigate how one might 
compensate for the decline of interoceptive accessibility, which could be especially beneficial for 
clinical therapists. For example, psychotherapeutic techniques used to assist younger adults who 
are experiencing an emotional crisis may not be applicable to older adults given the changes in 
interoceptive accessibility. Even the language that therapists use with older adults can be 
important when trying to connect with them on an emotional level (e.g., describing an emotion 
experience using behavior or situational words rather than interoceptive).  
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Table 1. Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges for the Emotion Modality 
means and Emotion Concept means for Studies 1 and 2. 
 
Variable Mean SD Range 
Modality    
   Interoceptive 
      Study 1  2.71 0.69 1.22 – 4.24 
      Study 2  5.95 1.50 1.27 – 8.93 
   Behavioral 
      Study 1  2.47 0.66 1.17 – 4.19 
      Study 2  4.93 1.26 1.93 – 7.76 
   Situational 
      Study 1  2.60 0.69 1.22 – 4.12 
      Study 2  5.74 1.60 1.48 – 9.19 
Concepts 
   Anger 
      Study 1  2.39 0.60 1.20 – 3.93 
      Study 2  5.97 1.71 1.24 – 9.00 
   Sadness 
      Study 1  2.34 0.64 1.13 – 3.93 
      Study 2  5.46 1.37 1.30 – 8.00 
   Fear 
      Study 1  2.42 0.72 1.07 – 4.29 
      Study 2  5.14 1.26 1.86 – 8.25 
   Disgust 
      Study 1  2.08 0.67 1.00 – 3.67 
      Study 2  5.41 1.52 1.11 – 9.00 
   Boredom 
      Study 1  1.77 0.57 1.00 – 3.72 
      Study 2  6.56 2.88 1.00 – 9.00 
 
  
32 
Running head: EMBODIED EMOTION CONCEPTS AND AGING 
Table 2. Correlations between Demographics, Emotion Modalities, & Emotion Concepts in Study 1.  
 Emotion Modalities Emotion Concepts 
Variable 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Demographics         
1. Age -.23** -.16†  -.05    -.20*      - .19*  -.19*     .-.11 -.19* 
2. Gender  
(0= male, 1= fem) 
.20* .16† .05 .10  .17†  .07      .09     -.10 
Emotion Modalities         
3. Interoceptive    .89***      .72***      .50***   .53*** .39***    .44***  .25** 
4. Behavioral       .83***      .50***   .52*** .42***    .49***    .34***  
   5. Situational        .46***   .46*** .39***    .42***  .29** 
Emotion Concepts         
6. Anger       .75***    .82***    .76***    .47*** 
   7. Sadness         .71***    .75***    .62***. 
8. Fear          .78***   .46*** 
9. Disgust          .46*** 
10. Boredom        -- 
Note: †p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 3. Fixed Effects for Study 2 Multilevel Model With Age as a Continuous Predictor. 
Variables B SE (B)  t p 
Intercept   6.07 .380  15.99 < .0001 
Age   -.05 .035  -1.33   .184 
Age2   .01 .001    .70   .483 
Behavior  -.48 .220  -2.20   .028 
Interoception  -.53 .251  -2.13   .033 
Reaction Times (s)  -.04 .001 -7.66 < .001 
Age x Behavior    .01 .020   .67   .505 
Age2 x Behavior  -.01 .001  -.33   .741 
Age x Interoception    .06 .024   2.77  .006 
Age2 x Interoception  -.01 .001 -2.41  .016 
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Figure 1. Linear Regression Scatterplot of Interoceptive Ratings Across All Emotion 
Categories in Study 1.  
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Figure 2. Linear Regression Scatterplot of Behavioral Ratings Across All Emotion 
Categories in Study 1.  
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Figure 3. Linear Regression Scatterplot of Situational Ratings Across All Emotion 
Categories in Study 1.  
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Figure 4. Scatterplot of Interoceptive, Behavioral, and Situational Likert Ratings 
Controlling for Reaction Times, With Age as a Continuous Predictor in Study 2.  
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Appendix. Final List of 100 Emotion Concept-Property Items.  
 Interoceptive Situational Behavioral 
    
ANGER Blood Pumping Cheated Careless 
 Flushed Cruel Fixed Gaze 
 Head Rush Disgraced Growling 
 Hot Explosive Loud 
 Red-Faced Incompetent Pushing Away 
 Tightness Injustice Sarcastic 
 Juiced Insulted Screaming 
  Mistreated Staring 
  Persecuted Willful 
  Thwarted  
  Violent  
  Oppressed  
  Harm  
    
SADNESS Aching Abandoned Frowning 
 Drained Defeated Moaning 
 Exhausted Degraded Mumbling 
 Fatigued Failure Seeking Comfort 
 Numb Inferior Silence 
 Pain Intolerable Withdrawing 
 Weak Lonely  
 Weary Loss  
 Worn Out Rejection  
  Vulnerable  
  Wistful  
    
FEAR Breathless Danger Approach 
 Butterflies in Stomach Uncertain Avoidant 
 Dizzy Unprotected Careful 
 Faint  Cautious 
 Goosebumps  Protective 
 Heartbeat  Resistant 
 Jittery  Retreated 
 Knots  Running 
 Pale   
 Scalp Prickles   
 Sweating   
 Tense   
 Tingly   
 Warm   
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 Wide Awake   
 White-Faced   
    
DISGUST Ill Despicable Looking Away 
 Nauseas Immorality Lurching 
 Sick  Squint 
 Turned Stomach   
    
BOREDOM Drowsy Ambiguity Contemplative 
 Sleepy  Sighing 
 Sluggish  Sitting 
 Tired   
 
